Asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes have been intensively studied by Cramer et al. in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] . In those works the focus is on full privacy and full reconstruction. We propose an alternative definition of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes where a small amount of information leakage is allowed (and possibly also non-full recovery). By a non-constructive proof we demonstrate the existence of sequences that -following our definition of goodness -have parameters arbitrary close to the optimal ones. Moreover -still using our definition -we demonstrate how to concretely construct asymptotically good sequences of schemes from sequences of algebraic geometric codes related to a tower of function fields. Our study involves a detailed treatment of the (relative) generalized Hamming weights of the involved codes.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme [11, 19, 24] is a cryptographic method to encode a secret s into multiple shares c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n so that only from specified subsets of the shares one can recover s. Often it is assumed that n participants each receive a share, no two different participants receiving the same. The secret and the share vector c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) corresponding to it are assumed to be taken at random with some given distributions (usually uniform), and the recovery capability of a set of shares is measured from an informationtheoretical point of view (see, for instance, [6, 8, 18, 19] ).
The term ramp secret sharing scheme [11, Section 2.2] is used for those schemes where some sets of shares partially determine the secret, but not completely. This allows the shares to be of smaller size than the secret.
It is usual in the literature to consider the following two threshold values of secret sharing schemes [11, 19] :
• The privacy threshold of the scheme is the maximum integer t such that from no set of shares of size t one can deduce any information about the secret.
• The reconstruction threshold of the scheme is the minimum integer r such that from any set of shares of size r one can uniquely determine s.
In this paper we will only treat linear secret sharing schemes with uniform distribution on the secret and uniform distribution on the share vector conditioned to the secret, which is widely considered in the literature (see, for instance, [6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19] ). In this case, the secret is a vector s ∈ F ℓ q (for some finite field F q , where q is a prime power), and we assume that the shares are elements c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ∈ F q .
Define a q-bit of information to be log 2 (q) bits of information. Then, for the schemes that we consider, the mutual information between the secret and a set of shares is an integer between 0 and ℓ if measured in q-bits (see [19, Proof of Theorem 4] or [16, Equation ( 2)]). Therefore, for each m = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we may define the following threshold values [ 
16, Definition 2]:
• The m-th privacy threshold of the scheme as the maximum integer t m such that from no set of shares of size t m one can recover m q-bits of information about the secret.
• The m-th reconstruction threshold of the scheme as the minimum integer r m such that from any set of size r m one can obtain m q-bits of information about s.
Note that t = t 1 and r = r ℓ . The asymptotic properties of secret sharing schemes have been intensively studied in the literature [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] . More concretely, bounding the sequences of privacy and reconstruction rates, t/n i and r/n i , respectively, for sequences of linear schemes over a fixed finite field F q has been considered, together with the existence of sequences of schemes with good rates, where n i is the number of participants of the i-th scheme and goes to infinity.
However, such studies only focus on full privacy and full reconstruction, since only the threshold values t and r are considered. The purposes and main contributions of this paper are to give a new definition of asymptotically good sequences of linear ramp secret sharing schemes, which does not request full privacy (nor necessarily full reconstruction), study the sequences of privacy and reconstruction rates, t m i /n i and r m ′ i /n i , respectively, of these sequences, and give existential and constructive results on sequences with good rates. This problem has not been considered in the literature before. We should mention that in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 ] the schemes are requested to have certain multiplicative properties. We do not request our schemes to have such properties.
Allowing some information to be leaked (and possibly not being able to recover the whole secret) allows more participants to be corrupted. Twisting the problem, when a scheme is constructed and run, possibly more participants than expected are corrupted. Therefore, we study how much information is leaked in such a case. Privacy and reconstruction sequences of the form t m i /n i and r m ′ i /n i , respectively, measure how resistant the scheme is to information leakage and non-full recovery.
As is well-known, all linear ramp secret sharing schemes can be constructed from a pair of linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q [11, Section 4.2] . This allows us, by means of the material in [16, 19] , to translate the informationtheoretical properties of a linear scheme to coding-theoretical properties of the pair C 2 C 1 . In particular, bounding generalized Hamming weights (introduced in [29] ) of C 1 and C ⊥ 2 and relative generalized Hamming weights (introduced in [20] ) of the pair C 2 C 1 implies bounds on the privacy and reconstruction rates mentioned before.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by giving the new definition. In Section 3, we provide a non-constructive proof of the existence of asymptotically good sequences of schemes with parameters arbitrarily close to the optimal ones (extending the results in [22] ). The remaining part of the paper concentrates on explicit constructions of asymptotically good schemes from algebraic geometric codes. As a starting point in Section 4, we investigate what can be said about their relative generalized Hamming weights, as well as their generalized Hamming weights, using material from the appendix. In Section 5, we derive asymptotic consequences of the results in the previous section. Next, in Section 6, the parameters obtained so far are compared. Finally in Section 7 we translate the findings from Section 5 into results on asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes. We give a conclusion in Section 8.
A new definition of asymptotically good sequences of schemes
In this paper, we consider the following general definition of a secret sharing scheme. All schemes in this paper will be "ramp" schemes, therefore we will omit this term for brevity.
Definition 1.
A secret sharing scheme with secret set S is a family of disjoint nonempty subsets of F n q , S = {C s } s∈S , together with probability distribution over S and each of the sets C s .
A secret s ∈ S is taken and then encoded into a vector of shares c ∈ C s (the shares are the components of c), both chosen at random with the given distributions. We will assume that these distributions are uniform. Moreover, the scheme is said to be linear if S = F ℓ q , for some 0 < ℓ ≤ n, and
for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ F q , all s 1 , s 2 ∈ F ℓ q , and all c 1 ∈ C s 1 , c 2 ∈ C s 2 . In [11, Section 4.2], the following construction of linear secret sharing schemes is given: Choose linear codes (i.e. linear subspaces) C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q and W ⊂ F n q , with ℓ = dim(C 1 ) − dim(C 2 ) and C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W , and fix a linear vector space isomorphism ψ : F ℓ q −→ W . Then the secret sharing scheme is defined by C s = ψ(s) + C 2 . In other words, given s ∈ F ℓ q , we choose uniformly at random a vector c 2 ∈ C 2 and define as vector of shares the vector c = ψ(s) + c 2 . Observe that dim(C 2 ) measures the introduced uncertainty of the scheme.
It is stated in [11, Section 4.2] that this description includes all linear secret sharing schemes. We formally establish this in the next proposition, whose proof is straightforward and which also implies that linear secret sharing schemes and linear code pairs correspond bijectively: Proposition 2. Given a linear secret sharing scheme S = {C s } s∈S , define C 1 = s∈S C s and C 2 = C 0 (recall that S = F ℓ q ). Then, C 1 and C 2 are linear codes in F n q satisfying C 2 C 1 and 1. Define the equivalent relation ∼ in C 1 by c ∼ d if, and only if, there exists s ∈ F ℓ q such that c, d ∈ C s . Then it holds that c ∼ d if, and only
Moreover, if we take a subspace W ⊂ C 1 such that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ W , then we can canonically define an isomorphism ψ :
Fix a linear code pair C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q , for which k 1 = dim(C 1 ), k 2 = dim(C 2 ) and ℓ = k 1 − k 2 , and denote by S the secret sharing scheme constructed from it (for some vector space W and isomorphism ψ as before).
On the other hand, for m = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, recall the definition of the m-th relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) [20] of C 2 C 1 :
where
Recall that, for m = 1, 2, . . . , k 1 , the m-th generalized Hamming weight (GHW) [29] 
The following theorem, which is [16, Theorem 3] , gives a characterization of the threshold numbers t m and r m in terms of the RGHWs of the pair C 2 C 1 , where C ⊥ denotes the dual of the linear code C. 
From this discussion it follows that a study of the threshold values of any linear secret sharing scheme is equivalent to the study of the RGHWs of the corresponding linear code pair. Now we turn to asymptotic properties. Consider a sequence of linear secret sharing schemes
. .), all of them defined over the same fixed finite field F q . By Proposition 2, the i-th scheme is built from a linear code pair C 2 (i)
We will only consider sequences that satisfy
The number L represents the asymptotic information rate, whereas the number Ω − L = lim i→∞ (k 2 (i)/n i ) represents the asymptotic introduced uncertainty of the schemes.
We may now define asymptotically good sequences of linear (ramp) secret sharing schemes:
We say that a sequence of secret sharing schemes (S i ) ∞ i=1 is asymptotically good with deficiencies Λ 1 , Λ 2 and defects ε 1 , ε 2 if there exist sequences of positive integers (m 1 
The numbers ε 1 , ε 2 represent an asymptotic fraction of q-bits of the secret. Full privacy and reconstruction mean ε 1 = 0 and ε 2 = 0, respectively.
On the other hand, recall the Singleton bound [20, Section IV] for a linear code pair
From this bound and Theorem 3, it follows that
for the corresponding linear secret sharing scheme S (Proposition 2). Therefore, from the inequalities (4), we have that
Similarly for reconstruction. Hence, the deficiency numbers need to satisfy
being Λ j = −ε j L, for j = 1, 2, the optimal case, and they asymptotically measure how far the privacy and reconstruction numbers are from the bounds (4). We will usually consider a symmetric definition. That is, we will consider sequences where ε 1 = ε 2 , Λ 1 = Λ 2 and m 1 (i) = m 2 (i), for all i. In that case, we will simply write ε, Λ and m i for ε 1 , Λ 1 and m 1 (i), respectively.
The motivation behind this is the fact that if a number of participants are corrupted, then typically they can use their shares to obtain some information about the secret and also make it impossible to use their shares to recover the whole secret.
Remark 5. Observe that, from the monotonicity of the RGHWs, if a sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 is asymptotically good with deficiencies Λ 1 , Λ 2 and defects ε 1 , ε 2 , then it is also asymptotically good with deficiencies Λ j − η j L and defects
3 The existence of sequences with arbitrarily low Λ and ε
To demonstrate the existence of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes with arbitrarily low deficiency Λ and defect ε, we will give an extended version of [22, Theorem 9] , since this theorem only deals with either primary or dual code pairs, but not both simultaneously. We use the notation and results in [20] , [21] , and [22] . In particular, we use the concept of relative dimension length profile (RDLP) as appears in [20, Section III] . For 1 ≤ d ≤ n, and linear codes
is then the RDLP and it is known to be non-decreasing [20, Proposition 1] . Our interest in the RDLP comes from the following result corresponding to the first part of [20, Theorem 3] :
Following [21] we next define the numbers N 1 , N 2 and N 3 , for integers a, u, v, w:
, and
From [21, Lemma 9] we have:
Lemma 6. For fixed 1 ≤ k 2 < k 1 < n and I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the number of linear code pairs
Theorem 7 below is an extended and modified version of [21, Corollary 3] . Unfortunately, the proof in [21] of this latter mentioned corollary is slightly wrong as it relies on [21, Proposition 2], which is false. As will be clear from Theorem 7 and its proof, this problem is easily overcome by applying (6) instead of [21, Proposition 2] , and by replacing in [21, Corollary 3] the condition [21, Equation (4)] with a slightly stronger condition (one more term in the summation).
> n d
Proof. The term (7) is the total number of pairs
On the other hand, by Lemma 6, the number of pairs
≥ s is at most the term (8) . Similarly, the number of pairs
is at most the term (9) . As the RDLP is non-decreasing, this implies the existence of a code pair
The theorem now follows from (6).
The following theorem is an improvement of [22, Theorem 9] , which states that the RGHWs of both primary and dual nested code pairs can get simultaneously asymptotically as close to the Singleton bound as wanted.
then for any prime power q and sufficiently large n, there exist a linear code pair
Proof. We will look for sufficient conditions for Theorem 7 to hold when n is large, using (10) and (11) . In the same way as in the proof of [22, Theorem 9] , we can ignore polynomial factors in Theorem 7, take log q , and divide it by n 2 (not n). Then by using [22, Equations (6) - (8)] and notation as in Theorem 7, we see that
is a sufficient condition for the assumption of Theorem 7 when n is large.
Observe that the maximums in (12) and (13) are always achieved at σ = s+1 and σ ⊥ = s ⊥ + 1, respectively. By identifying R 1 , R 2 , α, δ, δ ⊥ , τ and τ ⊥ with k 1 /n, k 2 /n, a/n, d/n, d ⊥ /n, σ/n and σ ⊥ /n, respectively, we see that
is a sufficient condition for the assumption of Theorem 7 when n is sufficiently large. Since δ ≥ τ and δ ⊥ ≥ τ ⊥ , we see that the maximums in (14) and (15) are achieved at α = 0, simultaneously. Substituting α = 0 yields
When (16) ≥ (17), we may ignore (17) . Ignoring (17) and subtracting
Since we have assumed τ > 0, we can divide (18) by τ and obtain (10) . When (16) < (17), we may ignore (16) . Ignoring (16) and subtracting
Since we have assumed τ ⊥ > 0, we can divide (19) by τ ⊥ and obtain (11).
Using the above theorem we now establish the following existence result for asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes:
, there exists an asymptotically good sequence of secret sharing schemes (S i ) ∞ i=1 with deficiencies Λ 1 , Λ 2 and defects ε 1 , ε 2 .
By the previous theorem, there exists a sequence of pairs of codes C 2 (i) C 1 (i) with the previous parameters, and thus the corresponding sequence of secret sharing schemes satisfies
and similarly for reconstruction. Note that the hypotheses of the previous theorem are satisfied, since 
RGHWs and GHWs of algebraic geometric codes
The proof of Theorem 8 being non-constructive, we cannot specify the sequence of schemes treated in Theorem 9. Also, the deficiency numbers of these schemes can get as close as we want to the bound (5), but they do not reach it. In the remaining part of the paper we shall therefore concentrate on algebraic geometric codes, for which these problems can be overcome.
Recall that, given a linear code pair C 2 C 1 , lower bounding privacy numbers and upper bounding reconstruction numbers of the corresponding scheme are equivalent to lower bounding the RGHWs of C 2 C 1 and C ⊥ 1 C ⊥ 2 , respectively. Since the GHWs of C 1 and C ⊥ 2 lower bound the RGHWs of C 2 C 1 and C ⊥ 1 C ⊥ 2 , respectively, in many cases it will be sufficient to lower bound the corresponding GHWs. Therefore, in this section we derive general non-asymptotic results on RGHWs and GHWs of algebraic geometric codes, whose asymptotic consequences are given in the next section.
Let F be an algebraic function field over F q of transcendence degree one. Throughout the rest of the paper we consider divisors D = P 1 + P 2 + · · · + P n and G with disjoint supports, where the places P i are rational and pairwise distinct.
For algebraic geometric codes C 2 C 1 , the above theorem exactly gives d m (C 1 ) and M m (C 1 , C 2 ) when g < m. In Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 below we will improve it in the case m ≤ g for one-point codes.
Before, we mention an easy corollary to Theorem 10 regarding the socalled threshold gaps r m − t m ′ . We shall not use this corollary later in the paper, but the threshold gap r − t = r ℓ − t 1 (ℓ = dim(C 1 /C 2 )) having already been studied intensively in [8] , we believe that the corollary has some interest in itself.
Corollary 11. Let C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q be algebraic geometric codes defined from a function field of genus g.
The corresponding secret sharing scheme (Proposition 2) satisfies
Moreover, if ℓ ≥ 2g, then for 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ, we have that
and, if g + 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ − g, then r m − t m = 1.
Proof. Only the last part needs a proof. Since ℓ ≥ 2g, we have that m ≤ g implies that ℓ − m + 1 ≥ g + 1, and ℓ − m + 1 ≤ g implies that m ≥ g + 1.
In both cases, either r m = k 2 + m or t m = k 2 + m − 1, since at least one reaches the bound (4). Thus, one term g is subtracted and we obtain the first bound. On the other hand, if g + 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ − g, then both r m and t m reach the Singleton bound and the last equality is obtained.
From now on we will concentrate on one-point algebraic geometric codes. These are codes
As is well-known, the number of missing positive numbers in H(Q) equals the genus g of the function field. The conductor c is by definition the smallest element in H(Q) such that all integers greater than or equal to that number belong to the set. Consider the related subset
The following lemma is well-known (see [17, Lemma 12. For µ ≥ −1, the dimension k = dim(C L (D, µQ)) satisfies:
• k = µ + 1 − g if 2g − 2 < µ < n, and
From [16, Theorems 19, 20] we have the following method for estimating RGHWs of one-point algebraic geometric codes.
Choosing C 2 = {0} in item 1, we obtain a bound on the GHWs of C 1 . Similarly, choosing C 1 = F n q in item 2, we get a bound on the GHWs of C ⊥ 2 .
Proof. We will apply item 1 in Theorem 13 for µ 1 = µ and 
On the other hand, we have that
. Thus, from the previous theorem, we obtain
Since k ≥ µ − g + 1 by Lemma 12, the result follows.
Proof. We will apply item 2 in Theorem 13 for µ 1 = n + 2g − 1 and
Here, we used the assumption m ≤ g and the fact that g ≤ c. Thus,
On the other hand, {µ 1 + i 1 , µ 1 + i 2 , . . . , µ 1 + i m } ⊂ {α ∈ ∪ m s=1 (i s + (µ 1 − H(Q))) | α ∈ H(Q)}, which are m elements in the range (µ 2 , µ 1 ]. Thus, from the previous theorem we obtain
Since k 2 ≤ µ 2 − g + 1 and C 1 = F n q by Lemma 12, the result follows.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section we will in the following sections construct asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes from sequences of codes having GHWs which relative to their code length behave well. The below proposition suggests that we do not lose too much by treating GHWs rather than RGHWs.
Proposition 16. Let the notation be as in Theorem 13 and let
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
Asymptotic analysis for one-point algebraic geometric codes
In this section we establish asymptotic results regarding GHWs of one-point algebraic geometric codes. Given a function field F, we shall write N (F) for its number of rational places and g(F) for its genus. For asymptotic purposes, we will need the well-known parameter
where the limit is taken over all function fields over F q of genus g(F) > 0. The Drinfeld-Vlăduţ bound [28] states that
where equality holds if q is a perfect square. See [4] for the status on what is known about A(q) for q being a non-square. For convenience, we give the following definition:
On the other hand,
is an optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes defined from F i if n i /N (F i ) → 1 for i → ∞, where n i is the length of C i .
We start our investigations by commenting on [27, Theorem 5.9], which if true would imply that from optimal towers of function fields one could construct sequences of secret sharing schemes having any parameters L, Ω, Λ 1 , Λ 2 , ε 1 , and ε 2 -in particular one could always obtain equality in (5). Below we reformulate [27, Theorem 5.9] with the needed modification that ensures that the Singleton bound is reached when 1/A(q) < ρ, in contrast to 0 ≤ ρ, as it appears in [27] . We also adapt the formulation to better fit our purposes of constructing asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes. We include the proof from [27] to explain why this modification is needed.
be an optimal tower of function fields over F q . Consider R, ρ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ R ≤ 1. Let (C i ) ∞ i=1 be an optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes defined from
Proof. The first bound on δ is an easy consequence of the Goppa bound (the first part of Theorem 10). Now assume 1/A(q) < ρ. By assumption, for i large enough we have m i > g(F i ), which by the last part of Theorem 10 implies that
Dividing by n i and taking the limit, we obtain the result.
The theorem states that the Singleton bound (3) can be asymptotically reached when 1/A(q) < ρ, which implies 1/( √ q − 1) < ρ by (21) . However, this leaves the cases 1/A(q) ≥ ρ undecided. In the following we shall concentrate on finding asymptotic results for the cases 1/A(q) ≥ ρ. 
Our first result is a strict improvement to Theorem 18.
be an optimal tower of function fields over F q . Consider R, ρ with 1/A(q) ≤ R ≤ 1 and
be an optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes defined from
There exists a sequence of positive integers
In this proof we use the notation k i = dim(C i ). Let f : N → N be a function such that f (i) → ∞ and f (i)/n i → 0, as i → ∞. Now fix i. The Goppa bound (Theorem 10) together with Lemma 19 tell us that
. From this inequality and the monotonicity of GHWs, it follows that the sets {n i + 1 − ⌈h(i)⌉, n i + 2 − ⌈h(i)⌉, n i + 3 − ⌈h(i)⌉, . . . , n i } and
Therefore, from Lemma 20 it follows that
Now take a sequence of positive integers
(observe that the left-hand side is smaller than k i for large i). It follows from (22), (23) and the monotonicity of GHWs that
Dividing by n i and letting i → ∞, (23) becomes
and (24) becomes
and the result follows.
Using Lemma 19, we give the following result for lower values of ρ.
be an optimal tower of function fields over
Proof. Let 0 < ε < 1 be an arbitrary fixed number. From the Goppa bound (Theorem 10) and Lemma 19 we obtain that
Using again the monotonicity of GHWs we obtain that
Now, letting i → ∞ in (25) first and then letting ε → 0, we conclude that
In the following we concentrate on Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower [15] 
over F q where q is an arbitrary perfect square. This tower has the advantage that for a known corresponding sequence of rational places there is a simple formula for the conductors of the corresponding Weierstrass semigroups. Actually, a complete and simple description of the mentioned Weierstrass semigroups was given in [23] . Furthermore, it was shown in [26, 25] how to efficiently construct the corresponding asymptotically good one-point algebraic geometric codes. As our aim is to present concrete constructions of asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes, as opposed to the non-constructive existence results of Section 3, this tower suits our purpose well. We will apply the two new bounds on GHWs given in Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 to this tower.
In the rest of this section, q is always a perfect square and by (F i ) ∞ i=1 we mean Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower [15] . We will need the following properties of each F i (see [15] and [23] for more details): its number of rational places satisfies N (F i ) > q i−1 2 (q − √ q), its genus is given by
and it has a rational place Q i such that the conductor of H(Q i ) is given by
In the rest of the section,
is an optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes defined from
Recall from [26, 25] that we may assume without loss of generality that D i is chosen in such a way that C i can be constructed using
be Garcia-Stichtenoth's second tower of function fields over F q , where q is a perfect square. Let (C i ) ∞ i=1 be a corresponding optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes as described above. 
Proof. We may assume that
the result follows from Proposition 14 or Proposition 15.
We next use Wei's duality theorem (Lemma 20) to improve the previous result.
be Garcia-Stichtenoth's second tower of function fields over F q , where q is a perfect square. Let (C i ) ∞ i=1 be a corresponding optimal sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes as described prior to Theorem 23. Consider R, ρ, V with 0
Proof. Let f : N → N be a function such that f (i) ≤ k i = dim(C i ), for all i, and f (i)/n i → V . Now fix i. From Proposition 14 or Proposition 15, we have that
Write r(i) for the right-hand side, which may be assumed to be non-negative for large enough i (since R ≥
From Lemma 20, we conclude that
Dividing by n i and letting i → ∞, we obtain the result.
We observe that Theorem 24 simplifies to the last bound in Theorem 18 when V = 0, and improves the first bound in the same theorem when 2V = 1/( √ q − 1).
We conclude the section by discussing a recent bound that was derived in [5] for generalized Hamming weights of arbitrary one-point algebraic geometric codes C L (D, µQ) ⊥ . Combining [5, Corollary 2 and (12)] we obtain, for any u > 1 and the codes we are considering,
where n
(i+1−log √ q (u+1))⌋ − 1 and where
2 is the code length. We see that the method of [5] asymptotically produces nothing more than the first bound in Theorem 18 when applied to the codes of Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower.
Comparison of the obtained parameters
The goal of this section is to compare the parameters obtained in the theorems in the previous section. In all of them, we have the following parameters: the asymptotic rate R, the value ρ = lim i→∞ m i /n i , and the corresponding limit of generalized Hamming weights δ.
Since the overlap between Theorem 21 and Theorem 22 is clear, we will assume that q is a perfect square in this section.
We first briefly comment on the bound in Theorem 23. Its main feature is that it is of the form δ ≥ U + 2ρ, where U = 1 − R − 1 √ q−1 and U + ρ is the asymptotic Goppa bound together with monotonicity, and U does not depend on ρ. On the other hand, when ρ = 1 √ q−1 , then U + 2ρ = 1 − R + ρ and the Singleton bound is reached. Thus, this bound increases additively with ρ from the Goppa bound to the Singleton bound.
This means that, for every bound of the form δ ≥ A+ρ, where A does not depend on ρ, we have that A < 1 − R and there will always be a nonempty interval ρ ∈ (a, b) ⊂ [0, Next, in the following two propositions, we state when the bounds in Theorem 23 and Theorem 24 are not implied by the previous ones. We omit the proofs, which are straightforward computations.
Proposition 25. Assume that q is a perfect square and the parameters R and ρ satisfy the conditions in Theorems 21, 22 and 23. Then, the bound on δ in Theorem 23 is not implied by the bounds in Theorems 21 and 22 if, and only if,
Observe that the length of this interval for ρ is
which is a number in (0, 1) when q ≥ 9. For example, taking q = 9 or q = 16, we obtain that the length of this interval is 1/2 or 14/45, respectively. 
Observe that the length of the interval for V is at least
which is also positive if q ≥ 9, and for q = 9 or q = 16, is 7/16 or 13/45, respectively. For such values, the corresponding interval for ρ is nonempty.
7 Asymptotically good sequences of schemes from one-point algebraic geometric codes
Based on the analysis in Section 5, we are now able to construct asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes based on one-point algebraic geometric codes defined from optimal towers of function fields. Recall from Section 2 that linear secret sharing schemes over F q are in bijective correspondence with linear code pairs. Hence, a sequence of linear secret sharing schemes (S i ) ∞ i=1 can be viewed as a sequence of linear code pairs
q . Recall also from Section 2 that we only consider sequences satisfying conditions (S.1), (S.2), (S.3). That is, if
With this notation, according to the definition of asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes (Definition 4) and Theorem 3, the sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 has deficiencies Λ 1 , Λ 2 and defects ε 1 , ε 2 if
Our study of the asymptotic behaviour of generalized Hamming weights as presented in Section 5 therefore translates into theorems about asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes. Recall from the end of Section 2 that writing Λ, ε and m i means that Λ = Λ 1 = Λ 2 , ε = ε 1 = ε 2 and m i = m 1 (i) = m 2 (i).
be an optimal tower of function fields. Then, from pairs of corresponding optimal sequences of one-point algebraic geometric codes, one can construct an asymptotically good sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 of secret sharing schemes with deficiency Λ = −εL and defect ε.
Proof. Define ρ = εL, R 1 = Ω and R 2 = Ω−L. From Theorem 21, the corresponding sequence of code pairs
for a suitable sequence of positive integers m i . Now, we just need to define Λ = −εL in order to satisfy equations (27) and (28) .
be an optimal tower of function fields. Then, from pairs of corresponding optimal sequences of one-point algebraic geometric codes, one can construct an asymptotically good sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 of secret sharing schemes with deficiencies
− ε 1 L, and
and defects ε 1 and ε 2 .
Proof. Define R 1 = Ω, R 2 = Ω − L and ρ j = ε j L, for j = 1, 2. From Theorem 22, the corresponding sequence of code pairs
+ ρ 2 , and
for suitable sequences m 1 (i) and m 2 (i). Now, we just need to define Λ 1 and Λ 2 as in the theorem in order to satisfy equations (27) and (28).
be Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower over F q [15] . Then from pairs of corresponding optimal sequences of one-point algebraic geometric codes, one can construct an asymptotically good sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 of secret sharing schemes with deficiency Λ = −2εL + 1/( √ q − 1) and defect ε. The i-th scheme can be
Proof. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 27, using Theorem 23 instead of Theorem 21. (F i ) ∞ i=1 be Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower over F q [15] . Then from pairs of corresponding optimal sequences of one-point algebraic geometric codes, one can construct an asymptotically good sequence (S i ) ∞ i=1 of secret sharing schemes with with deficiency Λ = −εL + V and defect ε. The i-th scheme can be constructed using O(n 3 i log q (n i ) 3 ) operations in F q .
Proof. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 27, using Theorem 24 instead of Theorem 21.
We finally remark that when q is a perfect square, then similarly to Theorem 29 and Theorem 30 the schemes in Theorem 27 and Theorem 28 can be assumed to be of a form such that i-th scheme in the sequence can be constructed using O(n 3 i log q (n i ) 3 ) operations in F q .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have coined a new definition of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes, and then described how to obtain some sequences with parameters close to the optimal ones. The main results are Theorem 9, which is based on the non-constructive Theorem 8, and Theorems 27, 28, 29 and 30, which use sequences of pairs of one-point algebraic geometric codes that can be described in an explicit and constructive way when q is a perfect square and when Garcia and Stichtenoth's second tower of function fields is used. For applications in multiparty computation it has been shown that Garcia and Stichtenoth's first tower of function fields [14] has some nice properties [3, 9] (see also [2] ). However, it is not clear how to apply Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 for these towers due to lack of knowledge on the corresponding Weierstrass semigroups and therefore we have no version of Theorem 29 and Theorem 30 for this tower. Another concern regarding the first tower is that no low complexity method is known for constructing the related codes. Proof. Since D ∩ C 2 = {0}, we have that ρ(D \ {0}) ∩ ρ(C 2 \ {0}) = ∅.
Together with the fact that ρ(C 2 \ {0}) = {1, 2, . . . , k 2 } by definition, we conclude that i 1 ≤ k 2 , which implies that γ i 1 ≤ γ k 2 . Now, from the hypothesis 2g ≤ µ 1 ≤ n − 1 and Lemma 12, it follows that µ 1 = k 1 + g − 1 = γ k 1 . Thus, together with γ i 1 ≤ γ k 2 , we have that
On the other hand, {α ∈ ∪ 
